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DEVELOPING A MORE OBJECTIVE MEANS
OF EX POST FACTO LAW ANALYSIS-
DOBBERT V. FLORIDA
Ex post facto laws 1 have been declared inherently unjust because
they do not provide notice to those whose legal relations are af-
fected. 2 Finding no such injustice, the United States Supreme Court
in Dobbert v. Florida 3 held that the ex post facto clause of the
United States Constitution 4 does not preclude the states from sen-
tencing a criminal defendant to death under a procedure instituted
subsequent to the crime.
When John Ernest Dobbert, the petitioner, committed first degree
murder, 5 a 1971 Florida law provided that a person convicted of
a capital felony was to be punished by death unless the jury ver-
dict included a recommendation of mercy. 6 Before petitioner was
tried, however, that legislation was declared unconstitutional by the
Florida Supreme Court. 7 Shortly thereafter, in late 1972, the
1. An ex post facto law is "one making punishable what was innocent when done, or sub-
jecting the doer to a heavier penalty or burden than was then provided." 1 J. BISHOP, NEw
COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAw 159 (8th ed. 1892).
2. Marks v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 990, 992 (1977); United States v. Casson, 434 F.2d
415, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1970); People v. Dempster, 396 Mich. 700, 242 N.W.2d 391 (1976);
Waukesha Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Baird, 45 Wis. 629, 635-36, 173 N.W.2d 700, 703 (1970).
See also Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex-Post-Facto Laws,
14 U. CHI. L. REv. 539, 539 (1947); McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court of
the United States, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 269, 287 (1927).
3. 97 S. Ct. 2290 (1977).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I § 10, Cl. 1 provides that "[n]o State shall ... pass any .. .ex post
facto law ......
5. This murder was alleged to have occurred on December 31, 1971. Petitioner was also
found guilty of second degree murder which allegedly occurred between January 1 and April 8,
1972. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, 11, Dobbert v. Florida, 97 S. Ct. 2290 (1977).
6, The statute in effect when the petitioner committed the offenses stated:
Recommendation of mercy. -A defendant found guilty by a jury of an offense punish-
able by death shall be sentenced to death unless the verdict includes a recommen-
dation of mercy by a majority of the jury. When the verdict includes recommenda-
tion of mercy by a majority of the jury, the court shall sentence the defendant to
life imprisonment. A defendant found guilty by the court of an offense punishable
by death on a plea of guilty or when a jury is waived shall be sentenced by the
court to death or life imprisonment.
FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1971).
7. On June 22, 1972 the United States Supreme Court summarily held in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) that a Georgia death penalty statute violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. On July 17, 1972 the Florida Supreme Court in
Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1972) found the 1971 Florida capital punishment legisla-
tion inconsistent with Furman.
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Florida legislature enacted a new death penalty statute.8 Under this
new procedure, the judge, after taking the jury's advisory opinion9
into consideration, would render the final sentence.' 0 By operation
of this procedure, Dobbert was sentenced to death.11 After Dobbert
was convicted of first degree murder, 12 the jury recommended life
imprisonment. 13 The trial court, however, found that aggravating
circumstances and the absence of mitigating circumstances justified
the imposition of the death penalty.14  The Florida Supreme Court 15
affirmed Dobbert's conviction and sentence. 16
8. Section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes was enacted December 8, 1972. The new proce-
dure was upheld by the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), and
by the United States Supreme Court in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). See notes 56 &
57 and accompanying text infra.
9. The subsequently enacted statute provides:
Separate proceedings on issue of penalty. -Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt
of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing
proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or
life imprisonment ....
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(l) (1972).
Advisory sentence by the jury. -After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall de-
liberate and render an advisory sentence to the court based upon the following
matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist . . .
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist . . . which outweigh the ag-
gravating circumstances found to exist; and
(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to
life [imprisonment] or death.
FLA, STAT. § 921.141(2) (1972).
10. The legislation provides in part:
Findings in support of sentence of death. -Notwithstanding the recommendation of
a majority of the jury, the court after weighing the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if the court
imposes a sentence of death it shall set forth in writing its findings upon which the
sentence of death is based as to the facts:
(a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist . . . and
(b) That there are sufficient mitigating circumstances . . . to outweigh the aggravat-
ing circumstances.
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1972).
11. 97 S. Ct. at 2295.
12. As well as being found guilty of the first degree murder of his nine-year-old daughter,
Kelly Ann, petitioner was convicted of the second degree murder of his seven-year-old son,
Ryder Scott. Petitioner was also found guilty of child torture of his son, Ernest John, age
eleven, and of child abuse of his daughter, Honor6 Elizabeth, age five. Id. at 2294.
13. By a ten-to-two vote, the jury returned an advisory sentence of life imprisonment find-
ing that sufficient mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating circumstances. Id. at 2295.
14. Initially, the trial court examined the nature of petitioner's participation in the offense,
his intent at the time of the offense, his age, maturity, prior criminal activity and sanity. Based
on this examination, the trial court concluded that no mitigating factors were present. Dobbert
V. State, 328 So.2d 433, 435-37 (Fla. 1976) (per curiam 4-2 decision). Next, the trial court found
that aggravating circumstances were present due to the "heinous, atrocious, and cruel nature" of
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This Note will examine the traditional means by which the United
States Supreme Court has analyzed ex post facto objections to ret-
roactive changes in criminal law. New approaches promulgated in
Dobbert will be discussed and analyzed. Finally, the argument will
be made that, although Dobbert was a poorly written decision, it
created a more objective means of scrutinizing alleged ex post facto
laws.
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH: A HISTORY
OF SUBJECTIVITY
Traditionally, the ex post facto clause has been interpreted to pro-
hibit legislative 17 changes in substantive criminal law1 8 which are
disadvantageous to the accused19 and to prohibit changes in criminal
the crime. The court noted that petitioner had tormented his daughter by beating, kicking,
burning, choking, and almost drowning her; sewing up her wounds with a needle and thread;
depriving her of medical care; and ultimately murdering her. Id. at 437. It concluded that such
aggravating circumstances sufficiently justified the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 438.
15. Under the 1972 Florida statute, the death penalty sentence is subject to automatic
priority review by the Florida Supreme Court. The statute provides:
Review of judgment and sentence. -The judgment of conviction and sentence of
death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida within
sixty (60) days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record, unless
the time is extended for an additional period not to exceed thirty (30) days by the
Supreme Court for good cause shown. Such review by the Supreme Court shall
have priority over all other cases and shall be heard in accordance with the rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court.
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1972).
16. The Florida Supreme Court, after discussing the trial court's findings and conclusions,
summarily affirmed the imposition of the death penalty. 328 So.2d at 441.
17. The ex post facto prohibition is a restriction on the legislature, not the judiciary. Frank
v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 (1913). However, the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses prohibit similar retroactive changes made through
judicial construction. Marks v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 990 (1977); Rabe v. Washington, 405
U.S. 313 (1972); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
18. The ex post facto clauses (state and federal) have been construed to apply only to re-
troactive changes in criminal law. Calder v. Bull. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); T. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 264 (1869); J. STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 220 (5th ed. 1891). However, a statute may be ex
post facto though not penal in form if its sole purpose is to inflict a penalty upon persons for
their past acts. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 33 (1866). Contra, Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898). There is also authority
which argues that the framers of the Constitution intended the clauses to be applicable to
retroactive civil legislation. See Crosskey, The Ex-Post-Facto and Contract Clauses in the Fed-
eral Convention: A Note on the Editoral Ingenuity of James Madison, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 248
(1968); Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex Post Facto Laws, 14
U. CHI. L. REv. 539 (1947); Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 MICH. L. REv. 315
(1922).
19. See note 41 and accompanying text infra.
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procedure which deny the accused a substantial right guaranteed by
the law in effect when his offense was committed. 20 The traditional
ex post facto approaches toward retroactive procedural and substan-
tive changes were subjective and often resulted in substantial judicial
incongruity.2 1
Prior to Dobbert, the Court utilized a two-step test 22 to scrutinize
retrospective changes. 23 First, the change was identified as being
either substantive or procedural. 24  Second, if the change was pro-
cedural, 25 the courts would determine whether the right of which the
defendant was deprived was "substantial." When the Court held that
the accused was deprived of such a right, the procedural change was
declared to be ex post facto.
In each case in which the Supreme Court applied this test it clas-
sified procedural safeguards as "substantial" 26 or "non-substantial" 27
20. See text accompanying notes 22-38 infra.
21. See notes 26-38 & 42-43 and accompanying text infra.
22. The "two-step test" is the author's term for identifying the Court's means of scrutinizing
such laws.
23. This test originated in a treatise by Judge Cooley which stated that while legislatures
"may prescribe altogether different modes of procedure in their discretion . . . in so doing, they
must not dispense with any of those substantial protections with which the existing law sur-
rounds the person accused of crime." T. COOLEY, supra note 18, at 272. The United States
Supreme Court first applied the test in Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883) (5-4 decision),
over the vigorous objection of the dissenters. See note 26 infra for further discussion of Kring.
24. Similar identifications have been made under the contract clause and state constitutional
prohibitions of retroactive legislation. Likewise, such determinations are inevitably made when
state courts are permitted to follow their own procedural law when applying federal statutory
law, when federal courts are required to follow state substantive law in "diversity of citizenship"
cases, and when state courts are required to follow the substantive law of a foreign state. Cook,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 341-42 (1933).
25. When the change was identified as substantive, the Supreme Court utilized a different
set of tests. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra.
26. The Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant was deprived of a substantial
procedural right on only two occasions. First, in Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), the
Court held that when a conviction of second degree murder that was set aside no longer acted
as an acquittal of first degree murder, the accused was denied a substantial right. Second, in
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), the reduction of the number of jurors in a criminal
trial from twelve to eight was held to be such a deprivation.
27. On numerous occasions the Court has held that procedural changes did not impair sub-
stantial rights. In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925), the Court upheld the retroactive appli-
cation of a statute giving trial judges discretion in granting new trials. Mallet v. North Carolina,
181 U.S. 589 (1901), held that the subsequent enactment of a statute permitting the state to
appeal a grant for a new trial was not ex post facto. The Court in Thompson v. Missouri, 171
U.S. 380 (1898), held that a statute which authorized the comparison of disputed handwriting
with writing proven genuine did not deprive the accused of a substantial right when applied
retroactively. In Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896), a law requiring jurors to be literate
was held not to be ex post facto when applied to a black defendant who allegedly committed an
offense prior to the enactment of the law. Nor was a restructuring of a state supreme court,
reducing the number of justices hearing the accused's case, held to be a denial of the accused's
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without stating the criteria upon which the classification was made.
For example, in one case 28 the Court held that the retroactive appli-
cation of a change in jury qualifications did not affect "in any degree
the substantial rights of those who had committed crimes prior to [the
new statute's] going into effect." 29 In another case, however, the
Court held that the accused had a substantial right in being tried by a
twelve person jury which could not be abolished retroactively. 30 It
summarily concluded that a jury of twelve was "vital for the protec-
tion of life and liberty." 3' Similar superficial determinations were
made by state and lower federal courts. 32
This lack of standards resulted in nationwide disparity as to what
was considered a substantial right. For instance, a reduction in the
number of grand and petit jurors and the substitution of judge sen-
tencing for jury sentencing were held to be deprivations of substantial
rights in some jurisdictions but not in others. 33  Similar discrepancies
have arisen with regard to retroactive legislative changes which grant
substantial rights in Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894). The Supreme Court held in Hopt
v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), that a retroactive law permitting a convicted felon to testify at a
trial did not deprive a defendant convicted on the basis of that testimony of a substantial right.
In Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157 (1891), a retroactive change in federal venue rules was
held not to be ex post facto.
28. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896).
29. Id. at 589.
30. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
31. Id. at 352.
32. It has been argued that these determinations have been largely influenced by history
and tradition rather than reason. H. ROTTSCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 778 (1939). See, e.g., DuPont v. Ingram, 293 A.2d 289 (Del. 1972) (holding that
onerous statutes relating to penal administration did not deprive a convicted criminal of a sub-
stantial right); Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 208 S.E.2d 791 (1974) (holding that the right to
make an unsworn statement is not a substantial right). For examples of federal cases on this
point, see notes 33-34 & 36-38 and accompanying text infra.
33. The Oklahoma federal district court has maintained that the accused has a vested right
in the number of persons serving on a grand jury. United States v. London, 176 F. 976 (E.D.
Okla. 1909); United States v. Haskell, 169 F. 499 (E. D. Okla. 1909). Other jurisidictions have
held to the contrary. Hallock v. United States, 185 F. 417 (8th Cir. 1911), cert. denied, 220
U.S. 613 (1910); State v. Caldwell, 50 La. Ann. 666, 23 So. 869 (1898); State v. Carrington, 15
Utah 480, 50 P. 526 (1897).
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that the reduction of the number of
jurors in a criminal trial was a deprivation of a substantial right, an Arizona appellate court has
held that it no longer is, due to a recent decision which held that the Sixth Amendment does
not require twelve person juries. Compare State v. McIntosh, 23 Ariz. App. 246, 532 P.2d 188
(1975), citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), with Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343
(1898).
Jury sentencing was held to have been a substantial right prior to Dobbert in Georgia and
North Carolina while found not to have been a vested right in Florida, Illinois, and Texas.
Compare Winston v. State, 186 Ga. 573, 198 S.E. 667 (1938) and State v. Waddell, 282 N.C.
431, 19 S.E.2d 19 (1973) with James v. Twomey, 466 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1972); Donald v. Jones,
445 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1971) and Miller v. State, 332 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1976) (per curiam).
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the state the right to appeal, 34 impose more stringent appeal re-
quirements upon the defendant, 35 replace indictment with informa-
tion, 36 and eliminate the defendant's right to choose venue. 37  Addi-
tionally, parole and good behavior allowances have been held to be
both substantial and non-substantial rights. 38
The Court's approach to retroactive changes in substantive law
manifested difficulties similar to those encountered when analyzing
changes in procedural law. Originally, the Supreme Court concluded
that the ex post facto clause only proscribed substantive laws which
made an act a crime, aggravated a crime or increased the punishment
for a crime after the act or crime had been committed. 39  Later, this
34. Compare Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589 (1901); State v. Gould, 232 Ga. 844,
209 S.E.2d 312 (1974); and State v. Witte, 243 Wis. 423, 10 N.W.2d 117 (1943) (non-substan-
tial) with In re Jones, 500 P.2d 690 (Wyo. 1972) (substantial).
35. New Jersey law holds that a more stringent appeal requirement applied retroactively
denies the accused of a substantial right while other jurisdictions hold to the contrary. Compare
State v. Howard, 182 Neb. 411, 155 N.W.2d 339 (1967) and Scobie v. State, 407 P.2d 610
(Okla. Crim. 1965) (non-substantial) with State v. Finate, 13 N.J. Super. 302, 80 A.2d 341
(1951) (substantial).
36. There has been a national difference of opinion as to whether a change from indictment
to information is a deprivation of substantial rights. Compare People v. Myers, 44 I11. App.3d
860, 359 N.E.2d 197 (1977); State v. Kyle, 166 Mo. 287, 65 S.W. 763 (1901); Lybarger v. State,
2 Wash. 552, 27 P. 449 (1891); and In re Wright, 3 Wyo. 478, 27 P. 565 (1891) (non-substantial)
with Putty v. United States, 220 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955);
State v. Kingsly, 10 Mont. 537, 26 P. 1066 (1891); Garnsey v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. 547, 112 P.
24 (1910); State v. Rock, 20 Utah 38, 57 P. 532 (1899) (substantial right).
37. Although the United States Supreme Court has held that the accused does not have a
substantial right to choose venue, there has been opinion to the contrary. Compare Cook v.
United States, 138 U.S. 157 (1891) and Gut v. Minnesota, 79 U.S. (9 Wall.) 35 (1870) with
United States v. Strewl, 99 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 638 (1939), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947).
38. Jurisdictions are divided on the issue of whether parole is a substantial right. Compare
Lincoln v. California Adult Auth., 435 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1970); Voorhees v. Cox, 140 F.2d 132
(8th Cir. 1944); Still v. State, 256 A.2d 670 (Me. 1969); Berry v. Wolff, 193 Neb. 717, 228
N.W.2d 885 (1975); Commonwealth v. Maroney, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 118, 191 A.2d 866 (1963)
(non-substantial) with In re Griffen, 63 Cal.2d 757, 408 P.2d 959, 48 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1965); State
v. Board of Parole, 155 La. 699, 99 So. 534 (1924); Goldsworthy v. Hannifin, 86 Nev. 252, 468
P.2d 350 (1970); State v. Powers, 64 Wis.2d 643, 221 N.W.2d 692 (1974) (substantial).
Jurisdictions seem to be evenly divided as to whether good behavior allowances are substan-
tial rights. Compare Graham v. Thompson, 246 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 849 (1956); Singleton v. Shafer, 313 F. Supp. 1094 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Lembersky v. Parole
Bd. of Dep't of Corrections, 332 Mass. 290, 124 N.E.2d 521 (1955) (non-substantial) with Ex
parte Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 171, P. 958 (1918); Dowd v. Sims, 229 Ind. 54, 95 N.E.2d 628 (1950);
State v. Ellsworth, 142 Mont. 14, 380 P.2d 886 (1963); People v. Deegan, 34 App. Div.2d 835,
312 N.Y.S. 2d 666 (1970) (substantial).
39. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Calder first established these three substan-
tive categories of ex post facto laws. It also stated that "every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less or different testimony" than originally required is ex post facto. Id.
at 390. The Calder list has been affirmed by subsequent case law. Mallet v. North Carolina, 181
U.S. 589, 593-94 (1901). See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169 (1925); Duncan v. Missouri,
152 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1894); Gut v. Minnesota, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 35, 38 (1869).
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list was expanded to prohibit retroactive criminal legislation which
rendered an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punish-
able when committed 40 and which altered the situation of the ac-
cused to his disadvantage. 41 However, these tests and some varia-
tions lacked objective criteria upon which difficult decisions could be
based. The Supreme Court itself recognized the difficulty of deter-
mining whether changes in the law were more onerous to the ac-
cused.4 2 Subjective notions of "reason and common sense" led the
Court to hold, for example, that a three month extension of the
period of confinement prior to the execution of a convicted felon was
"clearly to his advantage," on the assumption that "every rational per-
son desires to live as long as he may." 43
Thus, the problems of subjectivity and incongruity inherent in the
substantive as well as procedural ex post facto guidelines placed an
institutional strain on the courts. The determinations of whether a
procedural right was substantial and whether a substantive change
was to the substantial disadvantage of the accused were made on a
case by case basis. The status of the accused depended on the juris-
diction in which his case was decided and upon the judges who heard
his case.
THE MODERN APPROACH: A POORLY REASONED
MEANS TO AN OBJECTIvE END
Despite weak analysis, the Dobbert opinion is significant because it
established two new ex post facto approaches. Through the applica-
tion of new, more objective tests, the Supreme Court rejected the
40. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
41. United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 84 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 15,285), aff'd, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 171 (1810). The Hall category has been expressly recognized by the Supreme Court as
an ex post facto test and was frequently applied prior to Dobbert. See, e.g., Lindsey v.
Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 383 (1898); Dun-
can v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 383 (1894); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1882).
42. In Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 325 (1905), the Court stated that "it may be
sometimes difficult to say whether particular changes in the law are or are not in mitigation of
the punishment for crimes previously committed."
43. Id.
This subjectively resulted in other seemingly contradictory Supreme Court decisions as well.
For instance, in In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890), the Court held that the retroactive applica-
tion of a statute requiring that a capital defendant be placed in solitary confinement until he is
hung was ex post facto. However, in Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483 (1890), the Court held
that a similar substantive change was not ex post facto. The Holden Court distinguished Medley
on the ground that there was no proof that the defendant in Holden was actually kept in solitary
confinement. The Medley Court, however, presumed that the accused was kept in confinement
without requiring or discussing proof.
State court decisions were based on equally subjective grounds. Judge Cooley made note of
the naturally contradictory results arising from such subjective analysis. He compared State v.
1977]
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petitioner's three ex post facto claims. 44 The first claim was that the
changes in the death penalty statute between the time of the commis-
sion of his offense and the time of trial deprived petitioner of a sub-
stantial right. 45 Second, petitioner argued that no valid death pen-
alty was "in effect" in Florida when the offense was committed since
the earlier statute was found unconstitutional.4 6 Finally, petitioner
contended that the new sentencing procedure was ex post facto be-
cause it provided that persons sentenced to life imprisonment must
serve at least twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole
while the prior statute contained no such provision.4 7
The petitioner's first ex post facto claim was based on the change in
judge and jury roles in imposing the death penalty. The 1971 Florida
statute, in effect at the time of the murder, made the jury verdict of
life imprisonment final, while the 1972 statute, in effect at the time of
trial, made the jury verdict advisory. 48 Mr. Justice Rehnquist, who
delivered the majority opinion,49 dismissed this claim for two reasons.
First, he found that the change in the Florida death penalty scheme
was procedural rather than substantive. The majority opinion stated
that the newer statute "simply altered the methods employed in de-
termining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was
no change in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime. "50
Williams, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 418, 422-23 (1846), a case in which punishment was held to have
been mitigated when the death penalty was replaced by fines, whipping, and imprisonment,
with Herber v. State, 7 Tex. 69, 73 (1851). a case which stated that whipping is more degrading
than death itself. T. COOLEY, supra note 18, at 268-70.
44. Petitioner also raised equal protection and unfair pretrial publicity claims. The Court
held that the state's decision to resentence to life imprisonment all defendants upon whom the
death penalty had been imposed at the time Furman was decided did not deny petitioner equal
protection notwithstanding the fact that he committed his offenses prior to Furman. 97 S. Ct. at
2302. The Court rejected petitioner's pretrial publicity argument because he did not dem-
onstrate that the extensive publicity he received manifested itself in any constitutional unfair-
ness. Id. at 2302-03.
45. Id. at 2297.
46. Id. at 2300.
47. Id. The majority 6pinion rejected this claim and held that the petitioner, having been
sentenced to death, lacked standing to challenge burdens attached to a life sentence under the
new statute. Id. at 2301-02.
48. Petitioner argued that the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment could not have
been overruled and converted to a death sentence by the trial judge under the law in effect
when the offenses were committed. Brief for Petitioner at 23, 97 S. Ct. 2290 (1977). The Su-
preme Court disagreed, finding petitioner's argument speculative because it could not "be said
with assurance that, had his trial been conducted under the old statute, the jury would have
returned a verdict of life." 97 S. Ct. at 2298.
49. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist. Chief Justice Burger, who joined the opinion of the Court, also wrote a
short concurring opinion.
50. 97 S. Ct. at 2298.
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However, Justice Rehnquist reached this conclusion through rein-
terpretation of cases in which the two-step test had been applied to
scrutinize procedural changes. These cases held that since the laws in
question were procedural, and the changes did not deprive the ac-
cused of substantial rights, the procedural changes in question did not
violate the ex post facto clause. 51 Unlike these cases, however, the
Dobbert decision did not make the second step substantial right de-
termination. Instead, the majority opinion summarily determined that
the 1972 Florida law was a procedural change and therefore not ex
post facto, failing to distinguish Dobbert from those cases in which
retroactive procedural changes were found to be ex post facto. 52
The Court's second reason for rejecting the petitioner's first ex post
facto argument was that the new statute was an "ameliorative"
change. 53 After comparatively analyzing the two Florida death pen-
alty procedures, the majority stressed that the 1972 procedure af-
forded the accused more constitutional safeguards than the 1971
scheme. 54 However, the Court's prior conclusion that the procedural
change was not ex post facto 55 made this analysis unnecessary. The
comparative analysis was also superfluous because such an examina-
tion had been made in Proffitt v. Florida, 56 the case finding the 1972
sentencing procedure constitutional. The Dobbert Court virtually re-
peated the Proffitt analysis and findings, 57 concluding that the "ulti-
51. The Court first relied on Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). In Hopt, at the time the
offense occured, a convicted felon could not have testified at trials. The law was changed sub-
sequently and the defendant was convicted on the basis of a convicted felon's testimony. The
Hopt Court examined the defendant's ex post facto claim in light of Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S.
221 (1883), a case in which the Supreme Court used the two-step test to strike down a retro-
spective law. The Hopt Court distinguished Kring because there was no denial of substantial
rights. 110 U.S. at 589. The Dobbert decision next relied on Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S.
380 (1898), a case in which the retroactive application of a law permitting a murder conviction
to be based on circumstantial evidence resulted in the defendant's conviction, Thompson v.
Missouri concluded that the defendant was not subjected to an ex post facto law by distinguish-
ing the non-substantiality of his position from the substantiality of the rights at stake in Kring
and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898). 171 U.S. at 382-86.
52. See note 26 supra.
53. 97 S. Ct. at 2298-2300.
54. Id. at 2299.
55. The Court concluded that a procedural change is not ex post facto "[e]ven though it may
work to the disadvantage of a defendant." Id. at 2298.
56. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
57. The Proffitt and Dobbert Courts both indicated that the 1972 capital punishment
scheme included a separate sentencing procedure and a requirement that the judge and jury
balance aggravating and mitigating factors. Additional safeguards recognized by both courts in-
cluded the mandatory requirement of a written finding when the death penalty was imposed
and a compulsory state supreme court review of cases in which the death penalty was the
sentence. Compare Dobbert v. Florida, 97 S. Ct. at 2298-2300 with Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
at 249-53.
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mate proof" that the 1971 procedure was more onerous than the new
procedure was that the 1971 statute was declared unconstitutional
while the 1972 scheme was upheld in Proffitt. 58
The petitioner's second argument was that there was no valid death
penalty "in effect" in Florida when the offense was committed. This
substantive ex post facto claim was rejected through the application of
the fair warning principle. 59 This principle is premised on the notion
that an individual has been given notice of the criminality of his con-
templated acts and the extent of applicable punishment. 60 Thus, the
accused would not have a successful ex post facto defense if he had
been warned of the potential criminality and punishment by the exis-
tence of a previous statutory scheme. The Court in Dobbert acknowl-
edged that the 1971 Florida statute was in effect when petitioner
committed the crime. Although this statute subsequently was de-
clared unconstitutional, 61 Dobbert held that the statute's existence
served as an "operative fact" to warn those who committed first de-
gree murder that the state would seek to impose the death penalty.
62
The dissenters 63 vigorously attacked the use of the "fair warning
test." 64  Justice Stevens' dissent noted that the Court did not cite
one ex post facto decision to support the use of the test. 65 Rather,
he said the majority opinion was based on a civil case which held that
a Supreme Court decision could not serve as a basis for retroactive
58. 97 S. Ct. at 2300.
59. Id.
60. For a discussion of the fair warning principle, see Note, Ex Post Facto Limitations on
Legislative Power, 73 MIcH. L. Rtev. 1491, 1496 (1975).
61. See note 7 supra.
62. 97 S. Ct. at 2300.
63. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion
criticizing the majority's application of the fair warning principle. 97 S. Ct. at 2303-06. Justices
Brennan and Marshall also jointly filed a separate dissenting statement indicating their views
that the death penalty is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in all cir-
cumstances. Id. at 2303.
64. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion referred to the majority's rationale as a "test", id. at
,2305, although the majority did not expressly recognize it as such. This dissent argued that the
fair warning test disregarded an underlying value of the ex post facto prohibitions, protection
against improperly motivated or capricious legislation. 97 S. Ct. at 2305-06. Although the dis-
sent did not argue that this value should be a means of scrutinizing alleged ex post facto legisla-
tion, there is authority for this view. Note, Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power, 73
MICH. L. REV. 1491 (1975). It is questionable, however, whether examining legislative intent
would result in more objective decisions. Cf. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3
VAND. L. REv. 407 (1950); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional
Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964) (intent of framers is a subjective means of con-
stitutional interpretation).
65. 97 S. Ct. at 2304 n.4.
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attack on a final judgment. 66 The dissenters also contended that the
Court should have adhered to the traditional Lindsey v. Washington
test 67 which defined an ex post facto law as "any punitive measure"
applied to a consummated crime "to the detriment or material disad-
vantage" of the accused. 68  They correctly recognized that the major-
ity gave no compelling reason to depart from this approach.69
Despite the flaws in the majority's reasoning, however, the use of
the fair warning test in Dobbert is justified because it is more objec-
tive than the Lindsey test. The fair warning approach entails the de-
termination of whether the penalty actually imposed could have been
inflicted when the offense was committed. Thus, the fact finder need
only determine whether the penalty for the offense differed from the
time when the crime took place and the time when the accused was
sentenced. 70 This standard is far less subjective than the Lindsey
test which requires courts to determine whether a statutory change is
to the substantial disadvantage of the accused.
Although the subjective Lindsey test remains valid, other aspects of
ex post facto scrutiny were significantly altered by Dobbert. Two new
tests were promulgated. First, instead of the traditional two-step pro-
cedural test, the Dobbert Court utilized a one-step approach requir-
ing dismissaf of ex post facto claims directed at retroactive procedural
legislation. Second, the substantive fair warning test was established
to scrutinize the unique Dobbert circumstances. Both of these new
approaches are more objective than the traditional methods of ex-
amining ex post facto laws and, therefore, should better promote
66. Justice Stevens' dissent noted that the Court based its decision on the civil case of
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). 97 S. Ct. at 2304 n.4.
Had the majority opinion relied on precedent, it could have referred to the substantive ex
post facto tests applied in previous cases. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra. The
majority could then have cited Marks v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 990 (1977). This case expressly
stated that the ex post facto clause is based on the principle of fair warning. Id. at 992.
67. 301 U.S. 397 (1937). In Lindsey a state statute, which changed the penalty for grand
larceny from "not more than fifteen years" imprisonment to "fifteen years" imprisonment, was
challenged on ex post facto grounds. The Court concluded that the statute was clearly to the
"substantial disadvantage" of the accused because he was denied any opportunity to receive a
sentence of less than fifteen years. Id. at 401-02.
68. 97 S. Ct. at 2304, citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. at 401.
69. See notes 65 & 66 and accompanying text supra.
70. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States v. Casson. 434 F.2d
415 (D.C. Cir. 1970), demonstrated the objectivity of this approach when examining a federal
statute which increased the minimum and maximum punishments for burglary. It held that the
statute was not ex post facto as applied to the defendant because it became effective over six
hours before the commission of the crime. Hence, the defendant was put on constructive notice
of the penalty which he could receive. Id. at 418-22.
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uniform decisionmaking. Although one cannot predict at the present
time whether the traditional substantive approaches will be
abolished, 7 1 Dobbert is an indication that the Supreme Court is de-
veloping a more objective ex post facto analysis.
Thomas E. McClure
71. A recent federal district court applied the Dobbert procedural approaches in Pedrosa v.
Sielaf, 434 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. I11. 1977). Pedrosa upheld an Illinois retroactive statute which
amended the standards for transferring juveniles to adult court. The Pedrosa court concluded
that the statute was not ex post facto because it was a procedural and ameliorative change.
